Japanese Reasoning Behind Attacking America:

What made them think they could prevail?

            Why did Japan think that they could defeat the United States, or even contend with them militarily when they attacked Pearl Harbor? The answer to this is a complex one and involves a number of different elements of Japanese society and strategy, as well as a number of grudges held by the Japanese people against America. This essay will briefly examine the factors that led to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and what led to their belief that they had a chance to compete militarily with the United States.
            Why the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor is a seemingly-simple question that requires an intricate answer. A variety of factors led to the Japanese attack on the morning of December 6, 1941. First among these was the Japanese desire for expansion. Since the twenties, Japan was in an expansionist mode and attempting to create an “Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” wherein they could control resources and become less dependent on foreign raw materials and resources. A population crisis in Japan, as well as overcrowding, and the only solution that appeared to the Japanese people was military expansion. Furthermore, they simply had the desire to “seize an adequate empire that was comparable to nations in the west” (Reischauer 189) who had already had their imperialist ages.
            In connection to these expansionist tendencies was the simple fact that the way the Japanese government was structured, the military was almost completely separate from civilian authority. Though this went back to Clausewitzian ideals of separation of civil government and military, in the case of Japan it led to problems. The separation of the military and civil authorities was what led to the Japanese bombing of a train in Manchuria that killed the puppet warlord Chang Tso-lin. When ordered by the emperor to discipline the military and those responsible, Prime Minister Tanaka was denied permission to do so by the military who claimed it would damage troop morale. Incidents like this, showing the military autonomy from civilian oversight, led to a number of problems climaxing when War Minister Hideki Tojo also became prime minister and directed the highly militaristic government of Japan through World War II.
            Gripes with the United States also played a major part in the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor. First among these was the nonrecognition of Chaing Kai-shek and his puppet regime in Manchukuo. That the United States would not recognize Japanese conquests angered the nation and pushed them towards war. Japan also objected to Anglo-American cooperation and the aid that the US gave to Great Britain against their allies, Italy and Germany. Embargoes that the United States had levied against Japan after Japanese expansionism became rampant also angered the Japanese as did the immigration exclusion policy that the United States used with Japan, keeping Japanese immigrants out of the US. Finally, the Japanese considered the American naval expansion to be directed directly at them, and found the massive fleet at Pearl Harbor to be menacing to their nation (Prange 5).
            With a combination of all of these factors, Japan was more than fueled to go to war. However, was she able? According to Charles Bateson, Japan was “as prepared as she would be for a short war against opponents possessing enormous resources and great industrial potential” (39). Indeed, a short war was prepared for. Japan had stockpiles of oil and other essential materials, but they would not last more than 2 years. Also, though her military had expanded greatly after four years of war with China, Japan’s economy was still incapable of waging a long war. Japan’s merchant marine was barely sufficient to maintain peacetime needs, and even then the nation lacked access to vital raw materials or industrial resources. But it also must be stressed that Japan’s troops were battle-hardened in China, obedient, capable of great physical endurance, and fanatically loyal to their cause. Though the officer corps was not outstanding, Japan had a strong troop base. As well, their navy had been “lavishly modernized” (Bateson 41) before the war. Overall, Japan was indeed well prepared for a short war.
            Japanese strategy seemed to run parallel to this idea of short war. Japan assumed that their attack on Pearl Harbor would render the United States’ fleet useless and unable to operate for at least a year after the attack. They also assumed a year for a “full American economic mobilization” (James 707). By that time, the Japanese would have fully prepared their perimeter in the West Pacific in their economic sphere, and thus would have had no problem repelling a newly- refurbished American fleet. Obviously, the actual turnout of the war was far different. Though the Japanese were able to win great tactical victories for the first six months after Pearl Harbor, after their limited supplies had begun to wear down, the nation began to lose steam. A negotiated settlement was planned for after the Pacific islands were secured, but after America promised that they would drive Japan to unconditional surrender, this strategy also fell.
            Overall, the Japanese were not prepared for the United States’ lightning-fast economic mobilization and the setup of their military left them ill-suited to deal with the consequences of this miscalculation. Japan obviously paid for this mistake in the blood of their troops when they found that American carriers were far more effective than previously realized and that the economy of the United States could be mobilized quickly to a war economy.

Works Cited

Bateson, Charles. The War with Japan: a Concise History. Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1968.
James, Clayton. "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War." Makers of Modern
Strategy. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986.
Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981.
Reischauer, Edwin O. Japan: the Story of a Nation. New York: Alfred a. Knopf, Publisher,
1981.